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Abstract: The paper examines the determinants of the division of labor within firms. It
provides an explanation of the pervasive change in work organization away from the
traditional functional departments and towards multi-tasking and job rotation. Whereas
the existing literature on the division of labor within firms emphasizes the returns from
specialization and the need for coordination of the work of different workers, the
present analysis focuses on the returns from multi-tasking, which is shown to arise
from informational and technological complementarities among tasks as well as from
the exploitation of the versatility of human capital.THE DIVISION OF LABOR WITHIN FIRMS     1
1. Introduction
Since the time of Adam Smith, the ongoing division of labor has been viewed
as a central feature of economic progress. This phenomenon has two aspects: (i) the
division of labor within firms and (ii) the division of labor between firms. The former is
concerned with the range of tasks performed by workers within any particular firm,
while the latter deals with the range of products that any particular firm produces.
However, the past decade has witnessed widespread changes in the
organization of firms that calls part of this conventional wisdom into question. These
changes are documented in a large body of case studies in the management and
business administration literatures.
1 On the one hand, the progressive specialization
between firms continues, as large numbers of businesses in both the manufacturing and
the service sectors divest themselves of marginal product lines and concentrate more
heavily on their "core competencies". On the other hand, there is evidence of a
progressive breakdown of occupational barriers within firms, as corporate hierarchies
are restructured and delayered, and workers are given wider ranges of responsibilities
across tasks. Consequently it may be said that, over the past decade, an increased
division of labor between firms is often accompanied by a reduced division of labor
within firms.
This paper focuses on the division of labor within firms, examining the change
in work organization away from the traditional functional departments (e.g.
production, administration, finance, design, and marketing departments) and towards
multi-tasking and job rotation within relatively small customer-oriented teams. We
provide an analysis that identifies some major determinants of this change and
highlights some important channels whereby these determinants work.
Section 2 presents a simple model of work organization. Section 3 derives its
implications for the division of labor within firms. Section 4 concludes, relating our
analysis to the existing literature.
                                               
1 See, for example, Hammer and Champy (1993), Pfeiffer (1994), Wikström and
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2. A Simple Model of Work Organization
For simplicity, consider a firm that employs two workers at two tasks (1 and 2)
to produce a homogeneous output q. The first worker devotes the proportion t of his
available time to task 1 (and thus the proportion (1-t) to task 2), while the second
worker devotes the proportion T to task 2 (and thus the proportion (1-T) to task 1).
Let e1 and e2 be the first worker’s labor endowment (labor input in efficiency units) at
tasks 1 and 2, respectively; and let E1 and E2 be the second worker’s labor endowment
at these two tasks. Then the production function is
qf e E e E =+ - - + tt 11 2 2 11 () , () TT bg (1)
where the marginal products are positive (f1, f2 > 0) and diminishing (f11, f22 < 0). We
assume that the first worker has a comparative advantage at task 1, relative to the
second worker: (e1/e2) > (E1/E2). Furthermore, for simplicity, the workers’ labor is
assumed to enter the production function symmetrically, so that we can restrict our
attention to the first worker.
To get a straightforward handle on the worker’s return from specialization
versus multi-tasking, we assume that the worker’s labor endowment ei (i = 1,2) at each
task i depends on two factors that we call
(i) the return to specialization: the more time a worker devotes to a task, the more
productive he becomes, due to learning by doing, and
(ii) the informational task complementarity: the more time a worker devotes to one
task, the more productive he becomes at another task, since the worker is able to use
the information acquired at the former task to improve his performance at the latter.
Let the returns to specialization, for the first worker above, be represented by
ss ss 11 22 1 == - tt bg b g   and   ,    ss 120 ', '> (2)
and let the corresponding informational task complementarities be given by
cc cc 11 22 1 =- = tt bg b g  and   ,    cc 120 ', '> (3)
We assume that the worker’s labor endowment at task i depends positively on these
two returns:
es c s c i ii i i i i == × = x ,, , bg 12 (4)
where  ¶x ¶ ¶x ¶ ji ji sc /, / di di > 0 for i, j=1,2.THE DIVISION OF LABOR WITHIN FIRMS     3
Now define the elasticity of the return to specialization with respect to the

















and define the elasticity of informational task complementarities with respect to the
fraction of time the worker devotes to the two tasks as
3















To provide a simple model of how the return to specialization and the informational
task complementarity affects the organization of work, it will be convenient to assume
that these elasticities are constants.
Another aspect of the firm’s production technology that plays an important role
in the analysis below is the degree of technological complementarity among the two
tasks, as represented by the cross-partial derivatives of the production function (1).
This feature may be called the “technological task complementarity.” Denoting the
labor services at the two tasks by lt 11 1 1 =+ - eE () T  and l t 2 2 2 1 = - + ( )e E T , we
















e == , which is the elasticity
of the marginal product of one task with respect to the other task, where i, j = 1,2,
ij ¹ , and ut t =- ,1  when j = 1,2.
Let the firm’s profit be pk =- q , where k is the labor cost which, for
simplicity, is assumed independent of the workers’ time allocation among tasks.
4 The
firm is assumed to determine this time allocation. The profitability of a marginal
reallocation of the workers’ time across tasks is
¶p
¶t
hh hh =× ++ ×× ×-× ++ ××× fs c n fs c n
sc sc
11 1 1 1 22 2 2 2 11 ch bg ch bg (6a)
                                               
2 As the worker devotes a greater proportion t of time to task 1, his returns to
specialization at that task rise, so that the elasticity h1
s is positive. Similarly for task 2.
3 As the worker devotes a greater proportion t of time to task 1, his informational task
complementarity from task 2 falls, so that the elasticity h1
c is negative.
4 This assumption is easily relaxed. If, for example, workers are not indifferent to their
time allocation and if the labor cost reflects these preferences, then the preferences
would enter as another determinant of the restructuring process below.THE DIVISION OF LABOR WITHIN FIRMS     4
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(6b)
by the profit function, the production function (1), and the labor endowments specified
in (2)-(5b).
Then the firm’s profit-maximizing organization of work is given by the
following condition:
5
Condition C1: If  ¶p ¶t / bg = 0  for   01 << t ,  and  ¶p ¶ t
22 0 / ch <  in the
neighborhood of  ¶p ¶t / bg = 0 , then the worker will be engaged in multi-tasking;
otherwise the worker will specialize by task.
We now proceed to examine determinants of work organization and the role of
these determinants in the restructuring process.
3. Determinants of the Organization of Work
Within this framework, the role of task complementarities and returns to
specialization in determining the organization of work can be highlighted by examining
two polar extremes of a worker’s human capital across the two tasks: “complete one-
sidedness” and “complete versatility:”
Case I: We call a worker completely one-sided when he is productive only at the task
in which he has a comparative advantage: s1 0 () t>  for t>0, and s2(1-t) = 0 for all t.
In this case equation (6a) becomes
¶p
¶t
hh =× ++ ×× ×> fs c n
sc
1 111 1 10 ch bg (6a’)
Since an interior optimum in the allocation of time across tasks is impossible in this
case, the organization of work will invariably be specialized by task.
                                               
5 Since the labor of both types of workers enters the production function
symmetrically,  conditions analogous to C1 and C2 determine whether the second
worker specializes or engages in multi-tasking. If there is specialization, the first
worker specializes at task 1 while the second specializes at task 2, since the first
worker has a comparative advantage at task 1, relative to the second worker.THE DIVISION OF LABOR WITHIN FIRMS     5
Case II: We call a worker completely versatile, when he is equally productive at both
tasks:  sx sx s x 12 () () () ==  and cy cy c y 12 () () () ==  for any positive x and y,
01 ££ xy , . If both workers are completely versatile, then, by our assumption of
symmetry, fff 12 == ',  eee 11 22 == ii, hhh 12
sss ==, hhh 12
ccc == and eee 12 21 == ij
for ij ¹ . Then equation (6b) reduces to
¶p
¶t
h h eh hh he h h
2





sc scn f f di bg di d i di ' ' (6b’)
Equation (6b’) together with Condition C1 imply that the organization of work
depends on (a) the elasticity of the return to specialization (h
s) relative to the elasticity
of the informational task complementarity (h
s) and (b) the technological task
complementarity (eij, ij ¹ ) relative to diminishing returns to labor (eii). To see this
simply and clearly, consider the following two special cases.
Case IIa: When there are constant returns to labor (so that fij = eij = 0, for i,j = 1,2),
it can be shown that the organization of work depends entirely on the returns to
specialization relative to the informational task complementarities. When an increase in
the time spent at a task raises the productivity of labor at that task by more than it
raises the productivity of labor at the other task, then work will be specialized by task.
In other words, there will be complete specialization when an increase in experience at
a task raises the proportional returns to specialization at that task by more than it raises
the associated informational task complementarities, i.e. when h
s + h
c > 0.
Conversely,  there will be multi-tasking when an increase in experience at a task raises
the informational task complementarities by more than the returns to specialization, i.e.
when h
s + h
c < 0. In sum:
Proposition 1: If the marginal products of labor are constant (eij = 0 for i, j = 1,2),
then the organization of work depends on the returns to specialization relative to the
informational task complementarity. In particular, when h
s + h
c < 0 there is multi-
tasking, and when h
s + h
c > 0 there is complete specialization.
To see this, it is convenient to visualize the firm’s profit maximization problem in terms
of an opportunity locus and an isoquant in ll 12 -  space. In particular, the opportunityTHE DIVISION OF LABOR WITHIN FIRMS     6
locus is given by lt 11 1 1 =+ - eE () T  and lt 22 2 1 =- + () eE T , and the isoquant is
given by  fq ll 12 , bg = (a constant). The firm’s problem is to choose the time
allocation  t so as to reach the highest isoquant achievable along its opportunity locus. 
It can be shown that when hh
sc +> 0, the opportunity locus is convex, as
shown by the curve OL in Figure 1a. If eij = 0 for i, j = 1,2, then the isoquant IQ is
linear in ll 12 -  space. When workers are completely versatile, the opportunity locus
is symmetric in ll 12 -  space, and by our symmetry assumption across tasks, the
isoquant is symmetric in the same sense. Then highest isoquant is reached at the two
end-points of the opportunity locus:  00 21 ,, ll didi   and  , which implies complete
specialization.
6
On the other hand, when hh
sc +< 0, the opportunity locus is concave, as
illustrated in Figure 1b. Then, clearly, the highest linear isoquant is attained in the
interior of the opportunity locus, at  ll 12
** , ch  in the figure. This  implies multi-tasking,
with t
* = 1/2 in this special case.
Case IIb: When the returns to specialization and the associated informational task
complementarities are equally responsive to changes in the fraction of available time
devoted to the relevant task, then it can be shown that the organization of work
depends on the technological task complementarity relative to diminishing returns to
labor. In particular, if an increase in the fraction of time devoted to a task raises the
returns to specialization at that task by the same proportional amount as the associated
informational  task  complementarities (hh
sc += 0), the organization of work will
involve complete specialization when the marginal product of labor service i ( i=1,2)
diminishes more rapidly with labor service j ( j i ¹ ) than with labor service i: ee ij ii < .
Conversely, there will be multi-tasking when ee ij ii > . In sum,
                                               
6Needless to say, this solution is not one of multiple equilibria. Rather, when the
workers are completely versatile, both types of workers are identical, and thus the firm
finds it worthwhile to devote half its workforce to task 1 and the other half to task 2.THE DIVISION OF LABOR WITHIN FIRMS     7
Proposition 2: If  hh
sc += 0, then the organization of work depends on the
technological task complementarity relative to diminishing returns to labor. In
particular, when ee ij ii > , for i j ¹ , there is multi-tasking; and when ee ij ii < , for
ij ¹ ,  there is complete specialization.
If  hh
sc += 0, the opportunity locus is linear; and if ee ij ii < , the isoquant is
concave to the origin, as shown in Figure 1c. Thus, the highest isoquant is once again
attained at the end-points of the opportunity, and workers will specialize by task.
However, if ee ij ii > , the isoquant is convex to the origin, as illustrated in Figure 1d.
Here the highest isoquant is reached in the interior of the linear opportunity locus, so
that workers engage in multi-tasking.
The special cases above help shed light on three major determinants of the
restructuring process, whereby the organization of work is changed from specialization
by task to multi-tasking:
(i)  Changes in information technologies that increase the informational task
complementarities: For example, the introduction of computerized information systems
often  gives employees easy access to information within the firm and thereby
encourages the exercise of multiple skills. In our model, the increase in informational
task complementarities may be represented by an increase the absolute value of the
elasticity hi
c.
(ii)  Changes in production technologies that increase the technological task
complementarity: For example, the application of flexible machine tools and
programmable equipment often makes different skills more complementary to one
another. In our model, the increase in what may be called “technological task
complementarities”  may be represented by an increase in the elasticity eij for ij ¹ ,
since this technological change raises the amount by which the marginal product fi of
task i increases in response to additional labor services.
(iii) Advances in human capital, produced by the education system, enabling workers
to become more versatile, i.e. more capable at performing multiple tasks: Recalling that
the worker under consideration has a comparative advantage at task 1, this increase in
versatility  may be represented by an increase of sx 2 ( ) relative to sx 1 ( ), for any
positive  x, 0 1 ££ x .THE DIVISION OF LABOR WITHIN FIRMS     8
Equations (6a) and (6b) provide a simple analytical context in which to analyze
the above determinants of the restructuring process. The profit-maximizing responses
of work organization to these determinants may be summarized by the following
proposition:
Proposition 3: Consider a firm in work is specialized by task (e.g., t = 1). Then, in
response to a sufficiently large
(a) improvement in information technology that reduces hi
c, for i = 1,2),
(b) improvement in production technology that raises eij i j , for  ¹ , and
(c) improvement in the versatility of human capital that raises s x 2()   relative to
sx 1 () , for any positive x, 01 ££ x,
the firm has an incentive to change its work organization in favor of multi-tasking..
Proof: Suppose that initially  ¶p ¶ t
22 0 / ch > . Then a sufficiently large reduction in hi
c,
for i = 1,2, and rise in eij ij , for  ¹  will lead to  ¶p ¶ t
22 0 / ch < . But  ¶p ¶ t
22 0 / ch <  is
still compatible with a corner-point solution, provided that  ¶p ¶t / b g exceeds
¶p ¶ t /( ) 1 - bg  over the entire range 0 1 ££ t . However, a sufficiently large rise in
sx 2 ()    relative to sx 1 ( ), for any positive x, 0 1 ££ x , will diminish  ¶p ¶t / b g relative
to  ¶p ¶ t /( ) 1 - bg  and thus lead to an interior solution.
Figures 2 provide an intuitive understanding of Proposition 3. Fig. 2a pictures
the firm’s initial state, in which work is specialized. Here the firm’s marginal profit
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Observe that the left-hand term is the slope of the isoquant IQ and the right-hand term
is the slope of the opportunity locus OL in Fig. 2a.
Then a sufficiently large increase in the informational task complementarities
(i.e. a sufficiently large reduction in hi
c, for i = 1,2) will turn the opportunity locus OL
from a concave function (as in Fig. 2a) to a convex one (as in Figs. 2b and 2c).
Moreover, a sufficiently large increase in the technological task complementarities (i.e.
a sufficiently large rise in eij ij , for  ¹ ) will turn the isoquant IQ from a convex
function (as in Fig. 2a) to a concave one (as in Figs. 2b and 2c). But as Fig. 2b shows,THE DIVISION OF LABOR WITHIN FIRMS     9
a convex opportunity locus and a convex isoquant are not sufficient to guarantee that
multi-tasking will be more profitable than complete specialization, since it is possible
for the opportunity locus to be sufficiently skewed to generate a corner-point solution.
However, the increases in the versatility of human capital reduce the skewness of the
opportunity locus and this, together with the increases in the informational and
technological task complementarities, leads to an interior solution in which multi-
tasking is the preferred organization of work.
4. Concluding Thoughts
Our analysis  attempts to provide a new perspective on the organization of
work. The recent literature on the division of labor within firms (e.g. Becker and
Murphy (1992), Bolton and Dewatripont (1994), and Yang and Borland (1991))
focuses  primarily on the returns to specialization relative to the costs of co-ordination
across workers. It shows, among other things, that as the costs of communication
among workers decline, the returns to specialization rise relative to the co-ordination
costs and consequently the division of labor within firms increases. Another branch of
the literature (e.g. Baumgardner (1988), Kim (1989), and Stigler (1951)) shows that as
the size of the market increases (due to, say, economic growth or the expansion of
international trade), the greater is the division of labor that it supports. Yet another
branch (e.g. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991)) shows how the division of labor within
firms depends on the degree to which performance on particular tasks is measurable
and the degree to which wages affect task performance. These contributions do not,
however, explain how educational achievements and recent technological advances -
particularly, the application of improved information technologies and the introduction
of flexible machine tools and programmable, multi-purpose equipment - may lead to a
reduced division of labor within firms. Our analysis has done so by examining changes
in the division of labor from the perspective of the intra-personal returns from multi-
tasking, rather than the inter-personal returns from co-ordination of worker activities
or the incentive effects of wages.
In particular, our analysis has focused on how complementarities among tasks
can be exploited when individual workers use their experience at one task to improve
their performance at another task. In practice, this phenomenon - versatility across
tasks, the ability to combine different tasks in meeting a customer's needs, the ability toTHE DIVISION OF LABOR WITHIN FIRMS     10
apply the knowledge gained at one task to improve productivity at another task - can
take on a wide variety of forms: the use of customer information gained from sales
activities to improve product design, the use of technological information gained from
production activities to improve financial accounting practices, the use of employee
information gained from training activities to improve work practices, and so on. The
literature on organizational restructuring (cited in Section 1) suggests that nowadays
this phenomenon plays an increasingly important role in the restructuring of work. In
this  context the introduction of new computer technologies and versatile capital
equipment can enhance inter-task complementarities and thereby lead to a decline in
the division of labor within firms.
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